U.S. government publishes Tri-Seal Advisory “Sanctions and Export Controls Relief for Syria” after U.S. Department of Commerce significantly relaxes export controls for Syria

The Advisory, published on the same day as President Trump hosted Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa at the White House, outlines permissible business with Syria, including business authorized by the September 2, 2025 Commerce Final Rule. The Final Rule establishes a new license exception for EAR99 items (License Exception Syria Peace and Prosperity, or SPP) and extends or expands Syria’s eligibility for several existing license exceptions (CCD, TMP, RPL, GOV, TSU, BAG, and AVS). For the last two decades, BIS maintained a general policy of denial for exports and reexports to Syria, with only narrow case-by-case exceptions. The Final Rule replaces that policy by (i) authorizing the export or reexport of all EAR99 items to most parties in Syria under the new license exception SPP, expanding applicability to Syria of existing license exceptions that had been unavailable to Syria, and (ii) establishing a more favorable license review policy for all other items subject to the EAR. The Final Rule follows Executive Order 14312, issued on June 30, 2025, which revoked the Syria Sanctions Regulations administered by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and directed Commerce to implement adjustments under the EAR. Please see our alert for information on OFAC’s response to EO 14312. These measures constitute the most significant easing of U.S. export controls on Syria since 2004.

Certain restrictions on Syria remain. Sanctions on Bashar al-Assad and associates, human rights abuses, Captagon drug traffickers, and other destabilizing regional actors continue. Syria is still designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and most items listed on the EAR’s Commerce Control List (CCL) require a license for export, reexport, or transfer to Syria.

New license exception

The Final Rule creates a new License Exception SPP at EAR § 740.5, which authorizes exports and reexports to Syria of all items designated EAR99, i.e., items subject to the EAR and not classified on the CCL with an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). Notably, License Exception SPP does not permit in-country transfers within Syria. In practice, this means an EAR99 item exported under SPP cannot later be reassigned to a different end-user or for a different end-use in Syria without separate BIS authorization. Further, SPP does not authorize transactions subject to General Prohibition 10 in EAR § 736.2(b)(10) (it cannot retroactively authorize exports that entered Syria without prior authorization).

Expanded eligibility for certain existing license exceptions

The following license exceptions are newly available or have expanded availability for Syria pursuant to the Final Rule:

1. Consumer Communications Devices (CCD; EAR § 740.19): Syria is added as an eligible destination. CCD authorizes the exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of items enumerated in EAR § 740.19(b), including mobile phones, personal computing devices, satellite receivers, and related software such as mass-market encryption products (e.g., ECCNs 5A992.c and 5D992.c). Unlike CCD for Cuba, Belarus, and Russia, the scope of eligible end users for Syria is not restricted to individuals and NGOs; any non-prohibited Syrian end user may receive CCD-eligible items.
2. Temporary Imports, Exports, Reexports, and Transfers (in-country) (TMP; EAR § 740.9): Eligibility for Syria is expanded beyond prior coverage for news-media items to include: (i) technology for use by U.S. persons abroad, pursuant to EAR § 740.9(a)(3); (ii) shipping containers under EAR § 740.9(a)(7); (iii) items for use by the news media under EAR § 740.9(a)(9); (iv) items exported to a U.S. person’s foreign subsidiary, affiliate, or facility abroad under EAR § 740.9(a)(10); and (v) personal protective equipment under EAR § 740.9(a)(11)(ii).
3. Servicing and Replacement of Parts and Equipment (RPL; EAR § 740.10): Syria is now an eligible destination under paragraph (a) of RPL, which authorizes the exports and reexports of one-for-one replacement parts, components, accessories, and attachments. Paragraph (b) of RPL (concerning servicing returns) remains unavailable for Syria. Of note, the Final Rule explicitly prohibits the use of RPL for exports or reexports that would support Syrian police, military, or intelligence end users or end uses, consistent with the restrictions in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. In practice, this means RPL may be used to support civil aviation or commercial repairs in Syria, but not for defense or security-related applications.
4. Government, International Organizations, International Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the International Space Station (GOV; EAR § 740.11): GOV is expanded to authorize the exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to Syria for or on behalf of U.S. Government agencies pursuant to EAR § 740.11(b)(2), including items exported at the direction of the U.S. Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, items provided under the Arms Export Control Act or Foreign Assistance Act, and technology or microelectronics exported under contracts with U.S. Government agencies. Additionally, GOV now applies exports and reexports to cooperating governments and NATO under EAR § 740.11(c), as well as to exports and reexports supporting inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention pursuant to EAR § 740.11(d). GOV cannot be used to authorize transactions otherwise prohibited under part 744.
5. Technology and Software Unrestricted (TSU; EAR § 740.13): In addition to operation technology and software, sales technology, and software updates already authorized under EAR § 740.13(a)–(c), TSU for Syria now authorizes the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of copies of technology previously authorized for export to the same recipient, pursuant to EAR § 740.13(g).
6. Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS; EAR § 740.15): Previously limited to foreign aircraft on temporary sojourn, AVS now authorizes temporary sojourns in Syria by U.S. registered civil aircraft and vessels, as well as foreign-registered ones. BIS has restricted AVS eligibility to items designated as EAR99 or controlled on the CCL solely for anti-terrorism reasons. The Final Rule clarifies that ECCNs 2B999, 3A991, 4A994, 5A992 (except for .z), and 9A991 are treated as anti-terrorism-only ECCNs for this purpose and hence eligible for AVS. Exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) under AVS may not support Syrian police, military, or intelligence end users or end uses, consistent with Supplement No. 2 to part 742.
7. Baggage (BAG; EAR § 740.14): BAG is now confirmed as available for Syria, covering personally owned items by individuals leaving the United States as part of their personal baggage not intended for sale or other disposal. The scope and limitations of BAG remain otherwise unchanged.

License review policy changes

The Final Rule amends EAR § 746.9(c) to remove the longstanding general policy of denial for license applications involving Syria and adopt a two-tiered framework:

• Presumption of approval for certain civil end-uses: Applications for CCL-controlled items to Syria will now be reviewed under a presumption of approval if the items are for bona fide commercial or humanitarian end-uses that support Syria’s economic development or population. In particular, BIS extends eligibility for this favorable treatment to telecommunications, water supply, sanitation, power generation, civil aviation, and other civil infrastructure sectors.
• Case-by-case review for other items: License applications that do not fall under the presumption of approval uses will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to evaluate the consistency with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. This policy replaces the blanket denial policy and applies even to items controlled solely for anti-terrorism reasons.

Continuing export restrictions on Syria

All exports and reexports to Syria remain subject to the end-use and end-user controls in EAR Part 744. These provisions prohibit transactions that involve, for example, nuclear, missile, or chemical/biological weapons activities; military or intelligence end-uses; or parties on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List. More than 300 Syrian nationals and entities remain designated under multiple sanctions programs (e.g., counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, human rights), and transactions with such persons require a BIS license even for EAR99 items. For instance, CCD may not authorize exports of smartphones to an SDN associated with the Assad regime or to a Syrian military entity. Of note, on September 30, 2025, President Trump issued a notice continuing the national emergency with respect to Syria, thereby maintaining the broader sanctions framework that supports these designations.

Separately, all license exceptions available for Syria are also subject to the general restrictions for all license exceptions in EAR § 740.2. These restrictions bar the use of any license exception if the transaction involves activities or destinations that raise national security, foreign policy, or nonproliferation concerns. In practice, exporters must confirm that the transaction does not fall under the prohibitions in § 740.2(a)–(g), such as restrictions on nuclear end-uses, military-intelligence end-uses, or other activities that require a license notwithstanding the availability of a license exception.

The final rule also does not lift the trade embargo on Syria under EAR § 746.9, nor does it remove Syria from Country Group E:1 in Supplement No. 1 to EAR Part 740, which covers countries identified as supporters of terrorism. These restrictions will likely remain in effect as long as Syria continues to be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

In addition, several license exceptions include Syria-specific limitations. For example, RPL and AVS may not be used for any exports or reexports that would directly or indirectly support the Syrian police, military, or intelligence services, or entities controlled by or acting on their behalf. These carveouts underscore that, despite the recent regulatory changes, exports involving Syria remain highly restricted and require careful due diligence to avoid violations.

General Prohibition Ten

General Prohibition Ten applies to the installed base of any EAR items unlawfully exported to Syria in the past. Companies will need to assess whether any potential projects involve repairing or servicing existing equipment or software. If so, prior to engagement, companies will need to determine if (i) new items can be delivered and installed without needing to repair or service any such equipment or software, and (ii) if not, whether such existing items are subject to the EAR. To the extent that projects that would involve servicing any such EAR items unlawfully exported to Syria in the past, the Company would require separate General Prohibition Ten authorization from BIS in addition to assessing specific licenses or general licenses for new exports or reexports of EAR items.

The Advisory

The Advisory outlines the available sanctions and export controls relief applicable to Syria, including:

• The June 30, 2025 termination of the Syria sanctions programs (the Syrian Sanctions Regulations), though sanctions remain on several individuals and entities in Syria, including Bashar al-Assad and his associate, human rights abuses, Captagon traffickers, persons linked to Syria’s past proliferation activities, ISIS and Al-Qa’ida affiliates, and Iran and its proxies under other sanctions authorities;
• Commerce’s September 2 Final Rule;
• The November 7, 2025 removal of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Hasan Khattab from the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT List), a type of Specially Designated National and Blocked Person List¹; and
• The November 10, 2025 partial suspension of the imposition of the Caesar Act sanctions for 180 days (replacing the May 23, 2025 waiver of these sanctions), except for certain transactions involving the governments of Russia and Iran, or the transfer of provisions of Russian-origin or Iranian-origin goods, technology, software, funds, financing, or services.

Authored by Yue-Zhen Li, Mark Ye, Lorea Mendiguren, Beth Peters, Ashley Roberts, and Andrea Fraser-Reid.