Panoramic: Automotive and Mobility 2025
The Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed) updated its Code of Ethics effective November 1, 2025, primarily to add a new section on “data-driven technologies,” including the security of systems that process patient data.
The update signals heightened compliance expectations for industry, not only for traditional commercial interactions with HCPs but also for digital health ecosystems. It also follows recent regulatory and enforcement pressures—in particular, FDA's enhanced focus on medical device cybersecurity and DOJ's emerging focus on cybersecurity vulnerabilities as potential violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). The convergence of these developments underscores that robust cybersecurity is a risk-management imperative for device manufacturers.
The updated Code principally adds a new section, Section XIV, on “data-driven technologies.” The new section recognizes that medical devices increasingly rely on software, connectivity, and data analytics, and emphasizes that companies must ensure trust and ethical stewardship as these technologies expand in clinical use. AdvaMed encourages companies to apply three categories of principles in deploying data-driven technologies:
The AdvaMed Code guidance supplements and interprets legal requirements, and this new Section XIV is no different—it provides thematic contours for compliance considerations that build on existing federal and state privacy and consumer protection laws. At the same time, the revision underscores industry commitments to ensuring their compliance programs evolve along with innovations in software, AI, and connectivity.
AdvaMed's update follows recent actions by FDA and DOJ that collectively reinforce the importance of systemic cybersecurity not only to device authorization and management but also to a manufacturer's FCA exposure.
In June 2025, FDA updated its final guidance, Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions, as we discussed here and here. Recognizing that “cybersecurity threats to the healthcare sector have become more frequent and more severe,” the guidance outlines FDA's recommendations for manufacturers of software-enabled or internet-connectable medical devices. Manufacturers must show that these devices have a “reasonable assurance” of cybersecurity as part of FDA's safety and effectiveness determination under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
The FDA guidance indicates that cybersecurity compliance is essential throughout a device's total product lifecycle—tracking AdvaMed's later update recommending that manufacturers protect data “through appropriate organizational security measures” and “train teams in relevant aspects of data protection and cybersecurity to maintain a consistently high level of threat awareness.”
In parallel, FDA has been seeking more detailed information from manufacturers on cybersecurity, both in terms of testing before the device is authorized and in terms of how the manufacturer will monitor post-market performance and address any cybersecurity deficiencies.
Given that many devices comprised of or containing software include both “device” and “non-device” functions, it is notable that FDA routinely expects marketing applications to include end-to-end testing of cybersecurity, i.e., of the product as a whole notwithstanding that its functions may not all be regulated by FDA.
With respect to management of cybersecurity after a device is authorized, FDA now requires for 510(k), De Novo, and PMA submissions that manufacturers include a “cybersecurity management plan” (CMP) in premarket submissions so that FDA can evaluate how they will maintain device safety and effectiveness in this respect after marketing authorization. The CMP must include:
DOJ has, in turn, pursued enforcement actions on the theory that cybersecurity shortcomings can serve as the basis for FCA liability. As we wrote about here, recent settlements reflect that cybersecurity vulnerabilities are increasingly FCA risks for government contractors, including device manufacturers. The government's settlement with Illumina, Inc., a biotechnology company, illustrates this point.
Illumina sold genomic-sequencing systems (a type of medical device) to federal agencies. The systems allegedly failed to comply with certain of FDA's device cybersecurity requirements, including by failing to incorporate cybersecurity throughout the product's life cycle. Despite no actual breach, DOJ alleged that Illumina's certifications of compliance and inadequate quality systems made its claims false.
Illumina's settlement did not involve an admission of wrongdoing, and it seems possible that the $9.8 million settlement amount, which was significantly lower than potential damages in the complaint, could be indicative of challenges the government will face to connect alleged cybersecurity weaknesses to government financial harm. In particular, DOJ (and qui tam relators) face a burden of proving how cybersecurity vulnerabilities meet materiality and causation standards under the FCA when the agency received the actual products or services for which the defendant billed.
These potential defenses notwithstanding, the settlement illustrates how DOJ (or relators) could extend this government contractor-based theory of liability to claims for cyber devices reimbursed by federal health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid, which could further increase potential financial exposure. Although, it is notable that in articulating its allegations in the settlement agreement, the government did not adopt a federal health care program reimbursement theory even though the Illumina relator advanced that theory in her complaint.
AdvaMed's update to the Code, FDA's cybersecurity guidance and related scrutiny, and DOJ's recent enforcement activity all point to a unified expectation that device manufacturers manage cybersecurity as an essential compliance obligation. They also collectively raise the bar for how companies align with industry benchmarks, manage their quality systems, and substantiate representations to the government. If you have questions about what these developments may mean in practice, please contact any of the authors of this update or the Hogan Lovells lawyer with whom you regularly work.
Authored by Jonathan Diesenhaus, Thomas Beimers, Suzanne Levy Friedman, Laura Hunter, and Evelyn Tsisin