Insights and Analysis

Justice recalibrated: What the Criminal Courts Review means for economic crime prosecution

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The publication of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts in June 2025 marks a significant attempt to reshape the structure, governance and workload of England and Wales' criminal justice system. The Review has clear implications for the investigation and prosecution of serious and complex economic crime. In a justice system already significantly strained by case backlogs, resourcing challenges and procedural bottlenecks, the Review proposes a series of structural reforms that, if implemented, could alter the trajectory of serious financial crime cases in years to come.

Context: Reform against a backdrop of delay

The scale of the criminal court backlog is well known: over 75,000 cases are waiting to be heard in the Crown Court, and some trials are listed as far ahead as 2029. Economic crime cases, often multi-defendant and evidence-heavy, are particularly susceptible to these delays. These systemic pressures not only risk undermining defendants' rights but also distort the enforcement environment, affecting prosecutorial decision-making, resource allocation and the viability of complex investigations.

In this context, the government commissioned Sir Brian Leveson to lead a two-part review. Part I, published in June 2025, focuses on policy and structural changes. Part II, due later this year, will examine operational and technological improvements. Together, they represent the most ambitious effort in a generation to reconfigure the criminal courts.

Key proposals

1. Expanding the role of magistrates' courts

One of the headline proposals is to extend magistrates’ sentencing powers to allow up to 12 months’ custody per offence. The Review also recommends reallocating more mid-level offences – including some fraud cases – to summary trial. While this could ease Crown Court backlogs, it raises concerns about the suitability of magistrates’ courts for cases involving complex facts, financial records and legal nuance.

Shifting more fraud matters to summary or hybrid forums could undermine sentencing consistency, with a risk that serious financial offences receive less predictable or less severe penalties – potentially weakening deterrence.

Summary trials also offer fewer procedural safeguards. Legal aid rules mean that defendants in the magistrates’ court often face tighter preparation timelines, with limited time allocated for lawyers and, in many cases, no entitlement to counsel. Similar conduct could therefore end up in very different forums depending on local resources, meaning the venue alone might shape not just the outcome but the quality of justice.

2. Introducing the Crown Court Bench Division (CCBD)

Perhaps the most controversial structural reform is the proposed Crown Court Bench Division – a new tier made up of a judge and two magistrates, sitting without a jury. It would hear either-way offences with a maximum sentence of three years or less, mirroring the current model used for appeals from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court; these are cases at the borderline between summary and indictable seriousness. While intended to relieve pressure on the Crown Court and reduce reliance on juries, it raises questions of consistency and legitimacy. A key justification has been the concern that jurors struggle to grasp complex evidence in serious fraud cases – but it is unclear how lay magistrates, who similarly lack legal training, are better equipped to do so.

Further, where the test for dishonesty (as formulated in Ivey1 and confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v Barton & Booth2 ) is assessed by reference to society’s standards (and includes an analysis of whether the defendant’s conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people), the necessity for a jury is arguably stronger than ever in fraud trials, where demonstrating dishonesty is essential to a successful conviction.

A conviction based on the views of three individuals, rather than twelve, risks uneven outcomes depending on the composition of the panel – particularly where decisions rest with professional judges rather than a broader cross-section of ordinary people.

For both defence and prosecution, the shift to a non-jury model for mid-tier financial offences would mark a significant cultural and procedural change.

3. Serious and complex fraud without juries: a fundamental shift

Trials involving serious and complex fraud present unique challenges, particularly when technical concepts must be explained to a jury. The Review proposes that, where subject matter falls “outside the understanding of the general public”, such cases could be tried without a jury. This would require courts to assess whether a case’s complexity – for example, involving accounting standards, regulatory frameworks or financial instruments – makes it unsuitable for lay determination.

The proposed test is ambiguous and could lead to inconsistencies in application and potential disputes over forum selection. Much will turn on how courts interpret and apply this test – and whether the early cases under the new model are demonstrably more efficient in practice.

In substance, the proposal opens the door to removing juries from some serious fraud trials. That would mark a significant departure from centuries-old legal tradition, where the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers has been a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in England and Wales. The shift could fundamentally alter how technical financial evidence is presented, tested and understood.

A further consequence is that judges would be required to give reasoned judgments, even where a defendant is acquitted – increasing transparency for all parties. However, preparing such judgments is time-consuming and may not reduce judicial workload. Over time, the emergence of detailed rulings in complex criminal cases could also shape substantive law and expand appellate review.

4. Early resolution and sentencing reform

The Review proposes allowing judges to give non-binding indications of likely sentence at an early stage, alongside more targeted disclosure, to encourage early guilty pleas. At first glance, this may seem similar to the existing Goodyear indication framework, but there are key practical differences.

A Goodyear indication must be requested by the defence and is only given if the judge is satisfied there is sufficient information to make a fair assessment – typically after substantial disclosure. It sets out the maximum sentence the defendant would face if they pleaded guilty at that point, and it is binding on the judge who gives it.

By contrast, the Review proposal would allow judges to offer a general view of the likely sentence earlier in proceedings, even before full disclosure. These indications would be non-binding, meaning the judge could depart from them later – making it unclear what practical weight such guidance would carry and how confidently it could be relied upon by the defence. They could also be judge-initiated, which risks creating unintended pressure to plead.

Practically, this changes the nature of the process: under Goodyear, the defence remains in control and can rely on the sentence indicated. Under the Review’s approach, the defence may be responding to an early steer without full context or certainty – raising questions about consistency, timing, and how well-informed the plea decision can truly be.

To further incentivise early pleas, the Review also recommends raising the maximum sentencing discount to 40% for those who plead guilty at the first opportunity. This is in line with Bar Council proposals.

In such cases – where investigations often involve extensive disclosure and evolving expert input – there’s a real risk that plea dynamics could outpace the development of a fair defence. If taken forward, these proposals will require careful balancing to protect procedural fairness.

Broader systemic questions

While the Review's language is focused on court efficiency, its recommendations invite reflection on broader issues relevant to criminal law enforcement:

  • Prosecutorial risk appetite: If more cases are diverted to magistrates' courts or the new CCBD, this is likely to influence charging decisions. Prosecutors may be incentivised to narrow case theories or prioritise lower-risk prosecutions. This could lead to forum shopping where prosecutors choose an advantageous forum over one that more accurately reflects the seriousness of the alleged conduct.
  • Disclosure and digital complexity: The second part of the Review will address technological reform, but in serious fraud, disclosure obligations are already a major friction point. Structural reform alone will not resolve this without corresponding investment and clarity on digital evidence management. This challenge is also the subject of Jonathan Fisher KC’s separate Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences, which is examining how disclosure law and practice should evolve in the face of increasingly digital and data-heavy cases.
  • Trial legitimacy and perception: In financial crime, where both public confidence and reputational impact matter, the nature of the trial forum can affect how justice is seen to be done. The erosion of jury trial, even at the margins, will be closely watched. Questions may also arise under Article 6 ECHR in respect of the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, if sufficient steps aren’t taken to ensure appropriate safeguards in judge-only forums.
  • Parallel reforms and future direction: The Review sits alongside ongoing legislative and enforcement developments, including reforms to corporate criminal liability and continuing evolution in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) practice. Although distinct, the shape of the courts will influence how those other tools are used.

Conclusion

The Review of the Criminal Courts could significantly reshape how serious and complex financial crime – and many other criminal cases – are prosecuted. Its most striking proposal is the removal of jury trials in serious and complex fraud cases, allowing judges to hear these cases alone. This would represent a major constitutional and procedural shift, fundamentally altering the way some of the most high-stakes criminal trials are conducted. While the reforms are likely to affect offences of lesser seriousness more frequently in practice, their implications for the justice system as a whole – and for public confidence in how fraud is prosecuted – are far-reaching.

For individuals accused of white collar crime, this would reshape the landscape. The absence of a jury may lead to more focused proceedings, but it will dramatically change how cases are argued. Combined with proposals for non-binding early sentence indications and increased discounts for early guilty pleas, there is a real risk that defendants may feel pressure to resolve proceedings prematurely, before evidence-gathering and legal analysis are complete. The potential loss of procedural protections, including the opportunity to present a case to a jury and adherence to stricter disclosure standards, may also influence charging decisions and outcomes.

The Review’s proposals carry strategic implications for corporates, particularly in light of legislative changes under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, in particular the failure to prevent fraud offence and changes to the test for corporate responsibility. The recommendation to allow judge-only trials might offer advantages in navigating technical evidence, but it raises legitimate concerns around transparency, legitimacy, and public confidence in verdicts. For companies, the practical impact may be more limited, simply because relatively few fraud prosecutions proceed to trial against corporate defendants. The implications for individuals, particularly senior managers and decision-makers, are likely to be more significant.

More broadly, while the Review is driven by a desire to increase efficiency, it is not clear the proposals will achieve that aim. Diverting more cases to magistrates or judges may not address the root problems – namely, a shortage of judicial resources and criminal advocates. As the report itself notes, the bottleneck is not the jury system, but the lack of sitting days, insufficient numbers of magistrates and judges, and too few qualified defence advocates. Without resourcing reform, procedural streamlining alone may not deliver the intended results.

For now, these are just recommendations. But the trajectory is clear: towards a more stratified and streamlined court system where long-standing assumptions about fraud trials – who hears them, how they're conducted and what safeguards apply – may no longer hold. The coming months and the publication of Part II will be key in shaping how far these reforms go.

 

 

Authored by Liam Naidoo, Claire Lipworth, Olga Tocewicz, and Reuben Vandercruyssen.

References
  1. Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club) [2017] UKSC 67, [2018] AC 391
  2. R v Barton and another [2020] EWCA Crim 575, [2021] QB 685

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