FCC heavily restricts foreign-made drones and drone components

Impact of inclusion on the FCC Covered List

The Covered List includes equipment and services determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”¹ Equipment on the Covered List is ineligible to receive FCC equipment authorizations, which are necessary for radiofrequency devices to be imported, marketed, or sold in the U.S.²

As a result of the FCC’s action, as of December 22, 2025, new UAS devices and models (commonly known as drones), and “UAS critical components”³ produced outside the U.S. will not be able to obtain equipment authorizations. UAS and UAS critical components from foreign countries that were authorized prior to that date may still be imported, marketed, and sold. UAS and components with existing FCC authorizations may also continue to operate, as this Notice affects eligibility for future authorizations only. However, clients using certain UAS to conduct state and local government contracted operations, especially those connected to Federal grants or cooperative agreements, should review updated policy contained in a recent OMB Memorandum to ensure they continue to meet contractual obligations in these circumstances.

This addition to the Covered List is unique as it is the only entry to date that is producer-agnostic; while the rest of the Covered List targets the products and services of specific companies, this addition affects any UAS and UAS critical components produced anywhere outside the U.S., regardless of the manufacturer.

Beyond the prohibition on equipment authorizations, FCC-administered subsidies, such as Universal Service Fund monies, cannot be spent to purchase or obtain Covered List equipment.⁴ Entities on the Covered List must also disclose their subsidiaries and affiliates to the FCC and certain communications services providers must disclose whether their networks include equipment or services on the Covered List.⁵

In a statement on X, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr stated that the action will help “secure our airspace and unleash American drone dominance” without disrupting “the ongoing use or purchase of previously authorized drones and with appropriate avenues for excluding drones that do not pose a risk.”⁶

Potential for further changes or waivers

The Public Notice notes that if the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS, class of UAS, or UAS critical component produced in a foreign country does not pose national security risks, the FCC will update the Covered List accordingly.⁷ The details of this process have not yet been made public.

Justification for ban

The interagency body’s National Security Determination found that UAS and UAS produced in foreign countries pose “unacceptable risks.” The Determination focused on a number of policy rationales:⁸

• Combatting malignant actors: Criminals, terrorists, hostile foreign entities, drug cartels, and other hostile actors have weaponized UAS to create serious threats to the U.S. Mass gatherings and critical infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to these threats.
• Protecting upcoming U.S.-hosted events: Securing major upcoming public events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America250 activities, and the 2028 Summer Olympics is a major national security priority, and the federal government has convened new task forces and grant programs focused on countering potential UAS-based threats to host cities and venues.
• Strengthening domestic UAS production: Echoing a recent Executive Order⁹, the Determination finds that the U.S. “must have a secure and strong domestic UAS industrial base,” which requires “direct defense industrial production capacity” and “defense-related production capacity.” Having a “resilient and independent” manufacturing infrastructure is deemed a national security imperative. This includes:
  • Domestic companies meeting production demand for dual-use technologies like UAS and not relying on foreign-produced components; and
  • Ending reliance on such equipment in order to reduce the risk of threats, including direct UAS attacks and disruptions, unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, and supply chain vulnerabilities.

As supporting evidence, the Determination cites, among other things:

• Lessons learned from the planning of upcoming U.S.-hosted events, including guidance from the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency on UAS and risks to soft targets;
• The use of UAS in foreign conflicts and drug smuggling into the U.S.;
• The need to scale up domestic production and export US-manufactured UAS abroad;
• The ability of foreign governments to “compel entities to provide real time telemetry, imagery, and location data above U.S. soil, or to change the UAS behavior via remote software updates;”
• The “opaque supply chains” for foreign-produced UAS; and
• The risk that foreign countries and entities subject to their jurisdiction could “leverage their roles as the producer of a UAS or UAS critical component to directly harm U.S. persons” by, among other things, disabling drone fleets used for public safety, coordinating swarms for disruptive or coercive purposes, and conducting surveillance or intelligence operations.

Analysis, next steps, and key questions

This action is expected to dramatically impact the drone industry, as it largely amounts to a de facto ban on new foreign-produced UAS and UAS components.

Looking ahead, drone industry stakeholders—including manufacturers, service providers, and the myriad industries and businesses that rely on the use of drones—should carefully evaluate their supply chains, including the origins of UAS and UAS critical components. Manufacturers and importers especially should take stock of existing inventory, OEM agreements, and whether any foreign-made equipment needs—or is now even eligible for—equipment authorizations.

Drone industry stakeholders should also closely track the new process by which the Department of War and Department of Homeland Security can make determinations that certain UAS and components (or classes thereof) do not pose unacceptable risks to national security. Our team is monitoring the development of this process and will provide a further update and help clients navigate the process once it is established.

Further, this change could have impacts beyond FCC equipment authorizations. For example, federal law restricts government procurement of Covered List equipment and services, and federal and state regulators may leverage the updated Covered List in various other ways. On the commercial side, buyers and vendors must manage the risks posed by this change. For example, contract terms may address whether foreign-made UAS or components can be used under the agreement. Many buyers already require vendors to certify that they do not use products on the Covered List.

We are continuing to watch for developments. For questions about the Public Notice or for guidance on assessing its impact on your business and planning next steps, please contact the authors.

Authored by Katy Milner, Lisa Ellman, Matt Clark, Warren Kessler, and Erin Mizraki.